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THE EVOLUTION OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS1
WILLIAM E. RAPPARD
University of Geneva
All living organisms, no matter how minute or insignificant,
when examined through the microscope, appear enormous, intri-
cate, and extraordinarily active. Similarly, the world at large,
when considered through the microscope of contemporary analy-
sis, has no doubt, at all historical periods, struck its immediate
witnesses as being infinitely complex and eventful. Is it, then,
a mere delusion if the flow of recent and current happenings
impresses us as being exceptionally uneven and rapid in its
course, as resembling indeed a swollen Alpine torrent at the
melting of the snow in the spring?
I believe not. I believe that, even viewed in the perspective
of centuries, the last ten years will be characterized by the future
historian as an epoch of extraordinarily numerous and radical
changes.
To consider the world in its political aspects only, what previous
decade has witnessed as many momentous events as the last?
The final, decisive struggle and the end of the greatest war that
has ever taken place. In Europe alone, the crumbling of four of
the most powerful monarchies. The setting up or resurrection of
seven or eight new or reborn sovereign entities. The spread of
the republican principle from three to fifteen states. The establish-
ment of a professedly communistic regime over a population
of more than a hundred million human beings at one end of the
continent and the setting up of several more or less absolute dic-
tatorships at the other. Finally, and leaving aside many minor
events which in less extraordinary times would have loomed un-
commonly large on the political horizon, such as state bankrupt-
cies and revolutions, the foundation of the first effective, free,
cooperative, and resolutely pacific League of Nations the world
has ever seen.
1
 An address delivered before the Geneva Institute of International Relations
on August 8, 1927.
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EVOLUTION OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 7 9 3
No wonder, then, that in this tempestuously changing world
the League of Nations should itself have undergone such modifi-
cations in its structure and in its functions that, less than eight
years after its legal birth, one should already think of speaking of
its evolution. The fact of its evolution is in itself both encouraging
and disquieting for the friends of peace.
It is encouraging as a proof of reality and vitality. In the rough
political weather of the last ten years, only those ships have in-
variably kept on an even keel which have remained in port. The
League has been battered about because it has sailed boldly out
into the open sea. Even if it has not always succeeded in mastering
the waves—even if it has sometimes been prevented from com-
pleting its trip and from delivering its cargo—it has at least
proved tolerably seaworthy. That is an achievement which
none could have foretold with certainty ten years ago.
On the other hand, the rhythm of growth and change in the
League may also inspire some misgivings. It must, at any rate,
call for very great vigilance. If stability is not an ideal, excessive
instability is neither a sign of health nor a condition of success.
To live fast is not necessarily to live long; a tempestuous youth
does not always guarantee a fruitful manhood nor a happy old age.
Let us therefore consider the evolution of the League with an
open mind, both hopeful and critical, seeking only to discover the
truth and thereby avoiding the double danger of unjustified
optimism and of undue despondency.
The League of Nations began to evolve even before it was truly
born. This first evolution we studied last year, when considering
the League as an historical fact.2 We then noted that none of the
conceptions of its principal founders had been completely realized
either in the Covenant, to the drafting of which they had con-
tributed, or still less in the League as it had grown out of the
Covenant in the first six years of its existence.
The League, as it is today, is neither exactly the Wilsonian
League to guarantee a just peace, nor the League of Le"on Bour-
geois to maintain a secure peace against, and at the expense of,
1
 See my paper published under this title in The Problems of Peace (London, 1927),
pp. 18-49, and reprinted in the June, 1927, number of International Conciliation.
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794 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
the vanquished, nor the League to which General Smuts proposed
to assign the duty of administering large parts of Europe, nor
even, although more nearly, the Cecilian League to prevent the
sudden outbreak of war. We noted last year that it was exactly
none of these things, that it was really both something less and
something more. It was, we found, not so much a League to
enforce peace as an international organization to promote volun-
tary cooperation, public discussion, and pacific negotiations
among its members.
Today we would examine somewhat more closely the recent
development of this organization. We propose to note the changes
it has undergone, first in its structure, and afterwards in some
of its principal functions.
THE MEMBERS
Of the structure of the League, by far the most fundamental
feature is, of course, its membership. One may differ, and publi-
cists have differed, as to which is the most important organ of the
League—the Council, the Assembly, the Secretariat, the Court,
or the International Labor Organization. All must agree, how-
ever, that the most vital organs of the League of Nations are,
as its name indicates but as is too often forgotten, the nations
which compose the League. Therefore by far the most signifi-
cant changes which have taken place in the structure of the
League are the fourteen admissions and the three resignations
which have occurred since its foundation.
When the Covenant was adopted by the Peace Conference
of Paris on April 28, 1919, its Annex provided that forty-five
states might belong to the League as original members. Of these,
thirty-two, the victorious belligerents, were to join as signatories
of the treaty of Versailles, and thirteen, former neutrals, were
"invited to accede to the Covenant." Of the thirty-two victors,
twenty-eight effectually joined by ratifying the treaty of Ver-
sailles; one, China, who refused to take this step, by ratifying the
treaty of Saint-Germain; while three, the United States, Ecuador,
and Hedjaz remained aloof. All of the thirteen neutrals invited
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EVOLUTION OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 795
to accede to the Covenant promptly did so.3 As a result, the
League had forty-two original members when the first Assembly
met in Geneva in November, 1920. Six more states were ad-
mitted in 1920, three in 1921, one in 1922, two in 1923, one in
1924, and one in 1926. The total membership of the League to-
day would therefore be fifty-six if Costa Rica, by seceding at the
end of last year, had not reduced it to fifty-five.
It might be interesting to analyze these figures from many
points of view, as the evolution of the League is naturally bound
to be influenced in its course by the composition of its member-
ship. In the limited space at my disposal, I shall make only two
observations. The first relates to the growing importance of
Europe in the League. In 1920, sixteen out of a total of forty-two
original members were European states, that is 38.1 per cent.
Today, twenty-seven out of a total of fifty-five members are
European, that is 49.1 per cent.
The other point to which I wish to call attention is the change
resulting from the gradual entrance into the League of the states
defeated in the Great War. The Covenant was drafted by the
victors in 1919, and it would have been surprising if it had not
been drafted primarily in their interest. All the permanent, and
all but one of the non-permanent, seats on the Council were to be
occupied by themselves. Now, in 1920 already, two of the de-
feated powers, Austria and Bulgaria were admitted into the
League. In 1922, Hungary followed, and Sweden, a second former
neutral, was elected to the enlarged Council. Finally, in 1926,
Germany was admitted into the League and given a permanent
seat on the Council. Furthermore, four former neutrals, Nether-
lands, Chile, Colombia, and Salvador, were elected as non-perma-
nent members in the place of the two, Spain and Sweden who, up
to last year, had alone represented that part of mankind which
was not associated with the military triumphs of 1918. Thus,
in the short space of seven years, the League of Victors became a
League of Nations.
The rapid and steady growth in the total membership of the
League is, of course, most gratifying both as a symptom and as a
3
 See Manley O. Hudson, "Membership in the League of Nations," American
Journal of International Law, XVIII, 436-458 (July, 1924).
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796 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
cause of increasing strength and influence. The satisfaction which
all friends of peace must feel on this score is unfortunately tem-
pered by two considerations of very unequal importance. The
first relates to the resignation in 1926 of two states which had,
since the beginning, been represented on the Council. It is
assuredly most regrettable that Spain and Brazil should have
been led to sever their connection with the League, and it is much
to be hoped and, I think we can add, confidently to be expected,
that they may sooner or later find their way back to the Geneva
fold.
Much more serious, in my view, is the prolonged aloofness of
the United States of America and also, although in a lesser degree,
of Russia, Turkey, Mexico, and of the smaller states which have
not yet joined. The significance and the consequences of the ab-
sence of America from the councils of the League are being
continuously and passionately discussed from divers points of
view. Whereas during the first years of the League's existence,
its whole policy seemed to be shaped by the desire to allure the
United States to Geneva, today a reaction has undoubtedly set
in. Furthermore, public opinion, even abroad, seems to be chang-
ing as regards this question. One of the League's strongest
supporters in America1 has lately gone so far as to give it as his
opinion that, on the whole, her absence may very well prove to
have been a blessing in disguise. In view of its obvious impor-
tance for the evolution of the League, I may be permitted to
consider this question for a brief moment quite dispassionately.
The absence of the United States I regard as a calamity, the
tragedy of which can hardly be overestimated. As long as the
great American republic declines to assume any responsibility
for the maintenance of peace through the instrumentality of the
League, the League, in my opinion, will lack the authority neces-
sary for assuring the maintenance of peace. The United States
is, in many respects, the actually or potentially most powerful
nation of the world. It is, beyond doubt, the most powerful of
those nations that have no specifically national interest nor bias
* See David Hunter Miller, Wilson's Place in History (an address delivered at
Albany, New York), p. 15.
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EVOLUTION OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 797
in the disputes of Europe, that hot-bed of war. It is primarily to
America's absence that I attribute the relative lack of fairness
and effectiveness which the League has shown in dealing with
such tasks as the government of the Sarr and the protection of
minorities, or with such conflicts as those of Upper Silesia, Vilna,
or Corfu. The absence of the United States has weakened the
League, not only immediately, by depriving it of the support of
what might be one of its most influential members. It has weak-
ened it also, and perhaps still more, indirectly. It has done so by
undermining the loyalty of various members toward the League,
by preventing them, for lack of faith in its effectiveness or for
fear of compromising their relations with America, from support-
ing it wholeheartedly and by allowing them in ce. "ain cases to
flout its authority or to vitiate its decisions by more or less veiled
threats of resignation. Without America, the League remains an
association of nations which one may join or leave at one's dis-
cretion, whose corporate solidarity is feeble and whose uncertain
collective will may be disregarded with impunity, at least by any
of its principal members. With America as a fall-fledged member
of the League, on the contrary, the League would necessarily
soon become universal. It would then be possible to envisage
seriously the definite organization of peace on the basis of impar-
tial justice and of real international security, without which war
remains a constant threat and disarmament therefore little more
than an extremely interesting but rather delusive subject of con-
versation and debate.
In stating this opinion, which I fully realize is not shared by
most European friends of the League, I do not overlook the great
political difficulties which might arise from the cooperation of a
state whose population is still far from being nationally homo-
geneous, nor the great technical difficulties which would be bound
to arise from the cooperation of a state, one branch of whose
legislature seems to find peculiar satisfaction in asserting its own
importance by opposing the foreign policy of the government.
Nor do I suggest that all business in Geneva should be adjourned
until the United States accedes to the Covenant, and the program
of the League defined mainly with a view to making it acceptable
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798 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
to Washington, as was perhaps too sedulously done during the
first years after 1919. That policy would seem mistaken, less in
its aim than because the means adopted for attaining it are per-
haps not the best fitted for the purpose. To suggest humbly and
imploringly that the League cannot do without America would
seem as contrary to the dignity of Europe as to the purpose of
attracting the United States. On the other hand, it would seem
no less unwise to proclaim haughtily and with obvious insincerity
that the League can very well forego American cooperation.
What, then, would appear to be the proper attitude? To do
one's best without the United States, in the hope that the allure-
ment of even limited success, combined with the consciousness
of the terrible historical responsibility incurred by preventing
that success from being complete, will sooner or later induce the
nation to which the world owes the existence of the League to
assume its natural place in Geneva.
THE COUNCIL
After the growth in membership, the second point to be noted
in the evolution of the organization of the League is the gradual
transformation undergone by the Council. In Lord Robert
Cecil's original draft of January 20, 1919, only the five principal
allied and associated powers were to be represented on the Coun-
cil. Thanks to the combined efforts of General Smuts, President
Wilson, and the representatives of the smaller powers in Paris, it
was decided, first that two, and then that four, of the latter, chos-
en by all the members of the League,5 should be represented.
According to the first edition of the Covenant of February 14,
1919, the Council was thus to consist of five permanent and four
non-permanent members. In the final draft, this provision re-
mained unaltered, but, perhaps at the instigation of the neutrals,
a clause was added for the further enlargement of the Council.6
5
 Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement (London, 1923),
I, 226; Philip Baker, "The Making of the Covenant from the British Point of View,''
in Les Origines el I'Oeuvre de la Sociiti des Nations (Copenhagen, 1924), II, 37.
6
 SchUcking und Wehberg, Die Satzung des Volkerbundes, 2. Auflage (Berlin, 1924),
p. 297.
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EVOLUTION OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 799
At its first meeting in Paris, on January 16, 1920, eight mem-
bers sat at the table of the Council. Four represented the
principal allied powers—the associated power having refused to
continue to work with its former associates—and four, the so-
called smaller nations. In 1922, as it was felt that certain impor-
tant groups of states should no longer be left without represen-
tation on the Council, and as it was feared that non-reelection
of the existing members without the previous adoption of a
regular code of procedure providing for a system of rotation in
office might give rise to an acute crisis, and possibly to resigna-
tions, and as the adoption of such a code was resolutely opposed
by various states, notably by Spain, the Council and the Assem-
bly agreed to increase the number of non-permanent members
from four to six. Finally, in 1926, a still further and much more
sweeping change was made. Germany, whose admission had been
refused in Versailles in 1919 and more and more generally hoped
for in Geneva ever since, insisted on a permanent seat as one of
the conditions of entrance. This alone made a change impera-
tive. Besides, at least three states, Spain, Brazil, and Poland, had
demanded a similar privilege, and one of them, Brazil, in March,
1926, went so far as to oppose Germany's request unless her own
was considered. The refusal of Germany and of several other
states to agree to these demands gave rise to the well-known
crisis of March, 1926, which led to the appointment of a Commis-
sion of Fifteen to consider the reconstruction of the Council.
The recommendations of this commission were adopted, with
some slight amendments, by the Council and the Assembly in
September, 1926. As a consequence, the Council was enlarged by
one permanent member and three non-permanent members. Its
structure was further altered by the adoption of the principle of
the non-immediate reeligibility of at least six of the nine non-
permanent members.
My object in briefly recalling these familiar facts is but to show
the general trend of the evolution of the Council and to seek to
assess its significance. This evolution resulted, first, in the in-
crease of the total membership of the Council from eight in 1920
to ten in 1922 and finally to fourteen in 1926, and, second, in the
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numerical preponderance of the elected over the permanent
members. The latter, who, according to the original Covenant,
were to enjoy a majority of one, are today in a minority of four.
What is the significance, and what are the probable conse-
quences, of these changes in the structure of the Council?
It should be noted, first of all, that they were brought about,
not as the corollary of a new theory in international affairs, nor
because they were deemed inherently excellent by their authors.
They are clearly the result of the pressure of political circum-
stances. They sprang from the desire to placate candidates, or
rather from the fear of disappointing them too grievously. The
fact that the Council was enlarged by the will of the great major-
ity of the members of the League is no more a proof of the real
superiority of a large over a small Council, nor even of their
preference in this respect, than the absorption of castor oil by one
afflicted with indigestion is the recognition of his partiality for
that beverage. As a preventive against a particular ailment, the
enlargement of the Council seemed necessary, although the resig-
nations of Spain and Brazil, which it was intended to forestall,
must lead one to question even its prophylactic qualities. As a
measure of general reform, however, it should be judged solely on
its inherent merits and quite irrespectively of the circumstances
which led to its adoption.
Prima facie there is undoubtedly something to be said in
favor of enlarging the Council of a growing League with in-
creasing responsibilities. Is it not conceivable that the Council
owes its increased prestige to its being more numerous and more
representative in membership in 1927 than in 1920, and is the
enhanced prestige of the Council not a gain for the League as a
whole?
That the prestige of the Council is today greater than it was
at the birth of the League is a fact as indisputable as it is grati-
fying, but that the growth of its moral authority is due to the
concomitant growth of its membership is, at best, a presumption.
It is not difficult to discover other reasons for this progress, which
was as noticeable from 1923 to 1926 as it has been since the addi-
tion of four new members, the accession of one of which, Germany,
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of course represents much more than a mere quantitative in-
crease. What, then, are the arguments which may be adduced
against the innovation?
There is one which, although perhaps more frequently urged
than any other, has not, in my opinion, much more than a formal
significance. It has been stated, notably in the British Parlia-
ment, that, as the Council can act only when unanimous, the
more numerous its members, the less the chances for unanimity
and the greater, therefore, the danger of deadlock. As a matter of
fact, in the present state of the League and of international so-
ciety generally, decisions of vital importance for all states can be
carried out only with the concurrence of all, whether they be
represented on the Council or not. On the other hand, experience
seems to have shown that decisions of minor importance can al-
ways be reached and carried out when the great powers on the
Council are in agreement and can never be effectuated in the face
of the decided veto of any one of them. To be sure, a small
nation can, in exceptional cases, and if represented by men of
exceptional courage and ability, hold out against the great,
but only if, in addition, it be assured of the open support of public
opinion the world over, and perhaps also of the covert support of
at least one great power on the Council. Under the circumstances,
therefore, the danger of deadlock in the Council does not appear
to be a probable consequence of the enlargement of its member-
ship.
There are, however, other objections to the enlargement of
the Council which would seem to carry far greater weight. In
the first place, I submit that the best policy is that which con-
forms most closely to political realities. That is the main reason
why among many of the best friends of the League, especially
in the smaller nations, a Council of fourteen members, a Council
on which Salvador and Columbia have technically the same in-
fluence and the same rights as Great Britain and France, is looked
upon with real misgivings. If the Council is to enjoy the greatest
confidence, it must be a body in which real power is, to some
extent at least, commensurate with real responsibility and in
which all members speak with full knowledge and act with such
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a measure of freedom as is compatible with their position as
representatives of sovereign countries.
Now, can it be expected that a Council of fourteen most un-
equal members be such a Council? Is it not obvious that within
it the real power, the real responsibility, and the real knowledge
will be confined to an inner circle, whose decisions will be prac-
tically and politically, even though not legally, final and binding
upon the other members? And what will be the position of the
latter if they remonstrate and insist on their technical rights?
If they refuse to endorse blindly the decisions of their major col-
leagues, as honest men and statesmen conscious of the dignity of
their country and of their duties to the League should do in
certain cases, what will be the likely result? Either they success-
fully resist the bullying to which they are bound to be exposed,
and then their action may shatter the Council and the League
itself by causing the great powers to withdraw the disputed ques-
tion from the jurisdiction of Geneva. Or they submit in silence,
as they are very much more likely to do, especially if they be
diplomats accredited in Paris, Rome, or London. In this case
their presence on the Council merely serves as a screen behind
which the policies of the great powers are shaped and carried out
—a screen, and at the same time a gag—which is unlikely to make
for sincerity and open diplomacy.
This leads me to state the second main objection to the unduly
enlarged Council which is entertained in many quarters. All
careful students of current international politics will recognize
that the great link between the League and the public opinion
of the world is the Assembly. Everything that tends to increase
the frankness, the reality, and thereby the interest, of the Assem-
bly proceedings strengthens that necessary bond. Now, the
Assembly, in its debates on the reports of the Council, which has
been and should again become the great annual event in the
life of the League, will be the more outspoken as it comprises
more influential members whose countries have assumed no
responsibility for the action of the Council under discussion.
By increasing from four to six, and then to nine, the number of
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the elected members of the Council, the League, while not, as I
see it, making the Council more truly effective, has certainly
exposed the Assembly to becoming less so, by depriving its natural
leaders of their freedom of speech.
In many respects, the Council in its present composition, re-
minds one of a coalition government in which the parliamentary
opposition is represented, not enough to be a real force in the
executive department of the state, but just enough to be appre-
ciably weakened in the legislature. That is why, paradoxical as
it may seem at first glance, the recent enlargement of the Council
tends, I believe, to endanger the authority of the Assembly and,
indirectly, to diminish the influence of those very states whose
chances of election to the Council it has increased.
On the other hand, the adoption by the Seventh Assembly of
the rules of procedure regulating the election and limiting the
term of office of the non-permanent members of the Council
should be hailed as a very real gain which, in my view, to a large
extent offsets the disadvantages to which I have just alluded.
Thanks to these rules, it is to be expected that the Assembly will
in future go about its business of electing the non-permanent
members of the Council with greater freedom, with less nervous
intriguing, and with less talk of crises and imminent resignations
than has hitherto been the case.
As, in sketching the evolution of the Council, I have not re-
frained from very frankly criticising it in its present structure,
I may be asked how, in my opinion, it might with advantage be
improved upon. Although I attach no objective importance
whatever to my views, but merely because I feel I owe it to those
whom my all too negative criticism may have disquieted or
irritated, I will briefly say that I would deem it preferable if
(1) the membership were reduced from fourteen to nine or ten;
(2) permanent membership were abolished and all members
were annually or biennially elected by the Assembly; (3) a number
of candidates equal to the number of great powers in the League
were held to be indefinitely reeligible whereas the remaining
members were to be considered reeligible only at every other
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e.
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f B
as
el
 L
ib
ra
ry
, o
n 
10
 Ju
l 2
01
7 
at
 1
4:
58
:4
3,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
C
am
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s.
 h
tt
ps
:/
/d
oi
.o
rg
/1
0.
23
07
/1
94
75
94
804 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
election; and (4) the rules of the Covenant, according to which
the states not represented on the Council are to be invited to send
representatives to sit as members for the consideration of all
matters specially affecting their interests, were applied in a less
perfunctory manner than heretofore.
Such a system, which it is of course much more difficult to set
up today than would have been the case a year ago, would, I
believe, present very real advantages.7 It would make the Coun-
cil more responsive to the will of the Assembly and to public
opinion. It would do away with the irritating distinction between
elective and non-elective members to which the resignation of
Spain and Brazil were due. It would prevent the over-represen-
tation of certain political groups, from which the Council and
the League are undoubtedly suffering today.8 For all these
reasons, it would, in my judgment, enhance the moral authority
of the Council, as well as the influence of the Assembly and the
vitality of the League as a whole.
Besides the structural evolution of the Council, another change
in its actual composition should be noted, which is perhaps of even
greater significance, and which is certainly to be hailed with un-
alloyed satisfaction. Whereas during the first years of the
League's existence the members of the Council were often men of
minor importance in their own countries, this has almost entirely
ceased to be the case, at least in so far as the representatives of
European governments are concerned. The fact that the Council
meetings have come to bring the foreign ministers of the greater
European states into personal contact four times a year is one of
the happiest developments of recent times and one which would
alone justify the existence of the League. Even if there were no
available indications of the fact—which is, of course, far from
being the case—the following figures alone would suffice to show
conclusively that the Council and the League have appreciably
gained in prestige in the course of the last seven years.
7
 Some such system was urged from various quarters last spring. See, for instance,
my article in the Revue de Genbve entitled "La r6forme du Conseil."
8
 The present Council of fourteen comprises, for instance, four out of the five
Continental allies of France, a circumstance which may well, to a certain degree,
explain the disaffection of her rival, Italy.
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Year
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927*
Number of
Council
Sessions
11
4
7
5
5
5
6
2
Number of
States
Represented
8
8
8
10
10
10
10-14
14
Number of Prime
and Foreign
Ministers Among
Council Members
5
0
0
1
7
15
27
12
Proportion of Prime
and Foreign Ministers
to Number of
Council Members
5.7 per cent
0
0 "
2
14
32 "
39.5 "
42.9 "
* Up to August.
THE ASSEMBLY
Can the same be said of the Assembly?
Measured by the same external standards, the Assembly also
would seem to have gained in international prestige since 1920,
as the following figures show:
Year
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926*
1926
Number of States
Represented
47
52
51
50
51
50
47
50
Number of Prime and
Foreign Ministers
Among Delegate's
6
8
9
6
22
17
16
18
Proportion of Prime or
Foreign Ministers to
Number of Delegation
12.8 per cent
15.4 "
17.6 «
12.0 "
43.1 "
34.0 "
34.0 "
36.0 "
* Extraordinary Assembly.
If the presence at the Assembly of the leading statesmen of the
members of the League is a true indication of the importance
which they themselves and their governments attach to the work
done in Geneva every autumn, then these figures also tend to
show an encouraging development. As a sympton of League vi-
tality, what one might call the improved membership of the
Assembly is undoubtedly gratifying.
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In order to judge fairly of the evolution of the Assembly as a
part of the institutional architecture of the League, however, it
would, of course, be necessary to take other indications into ac-
count also, It would, in particular, be necessary to estimate and
to compare the significance of the statements made, of the reso-
lutions passed, of the conventions drafted, and, above all, of the
influence exercised by the successive Assemblies on the develop-
ment of the League and on world politics in general. It is obvious
-ftrCenT
30
2«
li
o
141° till
^ /
/ft*
t
1
/
trz-7
that this cannot be done by any simple statistical method, nor
with any pretense of scientific accuracy. No one will deny that
the Assembly of 1920, by adopting the statute of the Court; the
Assembly of 1922, by the stimulus it gave to the reconstruction
of Austria; the Assembly of 1923, by the pressure it brought to
bear on the settlement of the Corfu affair; the Assembly of 1924,
by drafting the Protocol; and the Assembly of 1926, by admit-
ting Germany and thereby putting the Locarno treaties into
force, played a decisive part in world affairs.
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EVOLUTION OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 807
On the other hand, I wonder whether many careful students
of the League's evolution would deny that the first Assemblies
showed a spirit of self-confidence and of constructive imagination
which the more recent have failed to display. Whether it be the
disappointment over the rejection of the Protocol, the loss of
leadership resulting from the death of Branting, the absence of
Professor Gilbert Murray and the acceptance of office in Great
Britain by Lord Cecil, the natural effect of age, habit, and exper-
ience, or the growing preponderance of the Council, it is hard to
say. But personally I cannot escape the conviction that in the
wholesome emulation between the two bodies, the last three
Assemblies9 have not held their own against the Council and that,
unless a reaction sets in, the latter body may become dangerously
predominant. I say "dangerously predominant," because noth-
ing could weaken the loyalty of the majority of the states toward
the League, and thereby the influence of the League itself, more
than the feeling that, in the Assembly, they were being treated
with insufficient consideration, maneuvered, and subjected to
undue pressure by the minority of large powers represented on
the Council. It will be extremely interesting in this connection
to note the effects of the new rules of procedure governing the
election of the enlarged Council. Let us hope that they may not
result in still further weakening the Assembly by splitting it up
into rival factions.
The Assembly can play its all-important part as a general di-
rector of League policy and as a link between the Council and
the public opinion of the world only if it remains conscious of its
rights and of its duties, of its dignity, and of its corporate unity.
Its official members must, of course, never forget that they are
not merely individual exponents of their own private views, but
also responsible representatives of their respective states. At the
same time, some of them at least should have the imagination to
realize that the League is more than only the sum of its constitu-
ent nations, that it is a new political entity which, as such, needs
supranational leadership and calls for a new form of world states-
manship.
• Prior, of course, to that of 1927.
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Possibly the presence in the Assembly of a small number of
the world's greatest minds, drawn from other than only political
fields and freed from all governmental instructions, might quicken
its vitality, enhance its prestige, and increase its usefulness. It
has been observed, and it is not difficult to understand, that real
international leadership is rarely compatible with strictly na-
tional responsibility. That is the main reason why men like
Nansen, Lord Cecil before he joined the British cabinet, and
Gilbert Murray exercised and, in the case of Nansen, still exer-
cise, such real leadership in the Assembly. Having no strictly
binding official mandate, they expressed only their own views.
By so doing, they often reechoed the hopes, the fears, and the
wishes of the world more faithfully and more effectively than
their diplomatic colleagues.
Would it be inconceivable that, say, three men of great inter-
national reputation, such as Einstein, H. G. Wells, or the French
historian Aulard, should be invited to attend the Assemblies
with the right to address them if they felt that they had a useful
message to deliver? Could not, for instance, the Committee on
Intellectual Cooperation be requested to choose, every year,
three such men, and might it not thereby render the League and
the world a service truly worthy of the individual eminence of its
members?
The foes of the League have so insistently warned their fol-
lowers against the danger of the super-state that its friends, in
combating that notion, have often gone to the opposite extreme.
If by a super-state we understand a political entity whose sover-
eignty overrides that of its component parts, the League is, of
course, nothing of the kind. The states members of the League
of Nations enjoy a far greater measure of independence than do,
for instance, the so-called sovereign cantons which make up the
Swiss Confederation. It would, however, in my opinion, be equal-
ly erroneous as a statement of fact and unfortunate as a forecast
of policy to declare that the foundation of the League had exer-
cised and would exercise no influence whatever on the status of
its members, but merely offers them new possibilities of inter-
national cooperation. The British dominions also, to take another
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EVOLUTION OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 809
national example, are free and equal members of the British
Commonwealth of Nations. So, at least, we are constantly being
reminded on the highest authority, and so we are valiantly striv-
ing to believe. Even if our benighted Continental minds succeed
in understanding and sharing this conception, does it follow that
we must look upon the British Empire as nothing more than a
method of international cooperation and not as being, in itself, a
legal entity and a political reality of the greatest importance?
So with the League of Nations. Much less than an all-powerful
super-state, much more than a mere international letter-box, it is
a Commonwealth. Its authority, ill-defined but none the less
real, reflects the fundamental interdependence of its members
and rests at bottom on their inability to stand alone and on their
common will to pursue together common aims. In this pursuit,
they need more than purely national leadership. The role of the
Assembly—and there can be no greater—is to afford the oppor-
tunity for the gradual assertion of such leadership. Where are
the leaders whose intelligence and sympathies will be sufficiently
broad, whose constructive imagination sufficiently powerful, and
whose eloquence sufficiently inspiring to shape into one policy
the unexpressed but universally felt hopes and desires of a war-
weary humanity, slowly but still steadily awakening to the con-
sciousness of its fundamental unity and of its ideal oneness of
purpose?
The world, the League, and the Assembly are still—are more
than ever—awaiting such leaders, whom the present forms of
national organization have, since Woodrow Wilson, failed fully
to produce. May the press and the universities, so strongly rep-
resented in the present audience, succeed where parliaments and
governments have heretofore failed, and may they, even if they
cannot overnight beget or discover new world leaders, at least
prepare public opinion to accept them when the gods of history
allow them to appear on the scene of mankind!
THE SECRETARIAT
According to Article 2 of the Covenant, "the action of the
League . . . . shall be effected through the instrumentality of an
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Assembly and of a Council, with a permanent Secretariat." The
French text, "une Assembled . . . . un Counseil assisted d'un Sec-
retariat permanent," indicates rather more clearly that the Sec-
retariat was conceived to be an auxiliary body, intended to assist
the Assembly and the Council.
The idea of a permanent secretariat seems to have been born
of the experience gained during the war, notably by the British,
in the organization and working of similar administrative bodies
assisting the British committee of imperial defence, the war
cabinet, and the various interallied councils.10 Whatever its
origin, it has turned out to be one of the most novel and most
fruitful conceptions of the founders of the League. Its two funda-
mental characteristics were to be its purely administrative func-
tions and its entirely international composition and spirit. It was
to prepare and to carry out the decisions of the Assembly and of
the Council, not to initiate nor to shape any policy of its own.
The allegiance of its members was to be to the League only and
not to the governments of the various states from whom they
might be drawn.
Let us examine in turn these two aspects of the Secretariat, as
it was established at the birth of the League and as it has devel-
oped since. As an administrative agency, the Secretariat was,
from its inception, a very much more vital organ of the League
than the language of the Covenant would lead one to suspect—
and than most of its authors probably anticipated. This is due
to two main reasons. It may be laid down, first, as a general
principle that the relative importance of a civil service stands in
inverse ratio to the stability and activity of the political authori-
ty it assists. Where governments frequently change and where
ministers are more engrossed with extraneous than with depart-
mental duties, as is the case in most parliamentary states, the
civil service is the real power behind the throne. Where, on the
contrary, as for instance in my own country, the government is
very stable, the actual tenure of office of its members very long,
and their duties more administrative than political, the civil
service plays only a subordinate part.
10
 See P. Baker, in Les Origines el I'Oeiwre de la Soeiiti des Nations, quoted above,
vol. II, pp. 21, 40 et seq.
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Now, if one may compare the Council and the Assembly of
the League with national governments on the one hand and the
League Secretariat with national civil services on the other, it is
quite obvious that the balance of influence was at first in Geneva
very heavily weighted in favor of the administrative as against
the political organs. The League, especially during the first three
or four years of its existence, was a novel and apparently rather
insignificant instrument of international government. The states
represented on the Council and in the Assembly at first, as we
have seen, were inclined to send to Geneva men of minor im-
portance who changed from time to time and for whom their
intermittent League duties were never their main tasks. The
government of the League was therefore a weak government. Its
civil service, on the other hand, was correspondingly strong, all
the more so as its members were very discriminatingly chosen,
from an extremely wide field, for their ability and their devotion
to the ideals of the League. In all minor matters, and even in
several important ones, the functions of the members of the
Council and of the Assembly consisted mainly in delivering
speeches, in reading reports, and in voting resolutions which had
been carefully drafted for them by the Secretariat.
During these first years, Council meetings might sometimes
have been compared with the harmless pastime of children play-
ing with their toy sailboats on the pond of a city park, the master-
ful children being the Secretariat and the cardboard admirals on
board the boats the dignified and indolent representatives of the
powers. As the League grew in importance, a gradual change
came about. National governments, recognizing its possibilities,
tended to send their most representative men to Geneva, to en-
trust their national civil services with the preparation of official
instructions, and earnestly to discuss these instructions before
League meetings. Accordingly, the pond became the high seas of
the political world, the toy sailboats the super-dreadnaughts of
national policy, and the bemedalled and beplumed but very
passive admirals the real commanders in action. As a result, the
part of the masterful children on the shore naturally became less
decisive and more contemplative.
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-qns A"q A\&[os ^nq 'uoi^n^i^suoo s^x Aq %ou 'JOJ papiAOJd uaaq
'uopnpAa S^T JO pnpojd OIU^SJO ^^ajrid V zre 'SUOISSIUIUIOO
pu'B ^J'B^qiui ^uau^uuad aq^ JOJ ^daoxa 'saa^xuiuioo
anS'ea'^ aq'j jo SU^SJO jof^ra OA^ asaq^ A\uo
v JOJ paptAOjd 'pa^JBuiaj aq A'TJUI
•A"iquiassy aq^ jo pu^ ^IOUTIOQ aq^ jo suoi^iqosaj aq^ jo
aq^ ui a^jadooo MOU qoiqM SUOISSIUIUIOO ^JOSIAPB ssapunoo
jo iCouaiouja pu^ uoi^zipioads pas^ajoui pu^ ^uaradopAap
osp paureS s^q ^j •uoi^o'B anS'Ba'T; jo adoos
qSnojq^ 'puraq Jaq'jo aq'j uo 'paureSaj s^q ^i 'suoisioap
jaAo aouanuui a^ipauirai ui 'jaAamoq '^soj s'eq
Bq^ -jaq^o aq^ uo ^'BiJ'B^aJoag aq^ jo pu^ pu^q auo QX\% UO
aq
1
; jo suopounj aq^ pa^oajjB s'Bq anS'eaq; aq^ jo aoire^jod
-rai SUIMOJS aq:j Moq j^ap ap'Biu S'Bq ^i JI 'jaAaAvoq 'asodjnd
s^i paAjas aABq IJIM ^j 'UAVBjpjaAO qonui asjnoo jo si 'spjirapB
ssai ou uajpnqo aqi o^ saiSopd^ ^sajqranq Xui aajjojd
JOJ 'anrais ^uajaAajJi ^qnop puB !juaui!}jadrai Aj/s[
AvaiAaa HONHIOS avonnod Nvoiaawv HHX
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EVOLUTION OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 813
international impartiality above suspicion, some of the authors of
the Covenant at one time considered the possibility of calling upon
a distinguished statesman from one of the smaller countries to
organize and to direct it as "chancellor" of the League of Nations.
This idea was abandoned in favor of the present arrangement
before the final adoption of the Covenant. In view of subsequent
developments, it is difficult to imagine how an independent
chancellor, drawn from a small nation and deprived of the
national backing of any particular government, could have
secured and maintained the necessary authority over an inter-
national organization so far from universal in membership and
so preponderantly dependent upon the good will of Great Britain
and France as was the League of Nations during the first years
of its existence.
It was clearly understood, however, from the start that the
officials of the Secretariat were to be international civil servants,
and not in any respect national delegates. This conception was
very forcefully expressed in the report presented to the Council
by the British representative, Mr. A. J. Balfour (as he then was),
and adopted by that body at its meeting in Rome on May 19,
1920. The relevant passages of that report read as follows:
. . . . "By the terms of the Treaty, the duty of selecting the
staff falls upon the Secretary-General, just as the duty of approv-
ing it falls upon the Council. In making his appointments, he
had primarily to secure the best available men and women for
the particular duties which had to be performed; but in doing so,
it was necessary to have regard to the great importance of select-
ing the officials from various nations. Evidently no one nation or
group of nations ought to have a monopoly in providing the
material for this international institution. I emphasize the word
"international," because the members of the Secretariat once
appointed are no longer the servants of the country of which
they are citizens, but become for the time being the servants only
of the League of Nations. Their duties are not national but
international I shall propose that no member of the
Secretariat, during his or her term of office, shall accept any
honor or decoration except for services rendered prior to the
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appointment. The reasons for this proposal are fairly clear
The members of the staff carry out, as I have explained, not
national but international, duties. Nothing should be done to
weaken the sense of their international allegiance; the acceptance
of special marks of distinction or favor, either from their own
or from any other country, militates, in our view, against the
general spirit of the Covenant."
This view was fully shared by the Secretary-General himself,
who, in a memorandum submitted at the same session of the
Council, declared: "The members of the Secretariat act, during
their period of office, in an international capacity, and are not in
any way representatives of their own government."
As an almost necessary consequence of this conception of the
Secretariat, the leading officials of the League were, at first, drawn,
not from the ranks of the national diplomatic services, but quite
deliberately from other walks of life. Of the four under-secretaries
appointed in 1920, for instance, none was a professional diplomat.
Today, three out of four of them are. Although still theoretically
responsible to the Secretary-General alone, they, as well as many
other recently appointed officials, were all chosen in close con-
sultation with the governments of their respective countries.
That a man who has begun and probably intends to end his
career in the diplomatic service of his own country should not
consider himself to be loaned to the League for purposes not
solely international, while temporarily occupying a position of
political importance to which he has been appointed on the ex-
press recommendation of his own government, is more than one
may expect of human nature. And that a Secretariat largely
constituted of men thus seconded by their governments should
still be held to be entirely impartial when dealing with questions
affecting the prestige and interests of their respective countries
is more than common sense will admit. It is impossible, therefore,
not to note the evolution which has taken place in this respect
in the structure and spirit of the Secretariat in the course of the
last years.
The famous decree by which the government of one of the
principal states members of the League officially and expressly
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asserted its unconditional authority over the citizens of that
state holding international positions is but one external symptom
of that evolution. The position thus adopted by that government
with a measure of frankness which is not, in my eyes, the un-
loveliest trait of its general policy, is perhaps not very different
from that more discreetly assumed by others. So long as that
position remains unchallenged by the League as a whole, it will
be very difficult, to say the least, to consider all members of the
Secretariat as entirely above the suspicion of national partiality
in their international functions.
If one must note, not without regret, this evolution of the
Secretariat, one should neither overlook the circumstances which
have determined it nor exaggerate the disadvantages and the
dangers of the present position. The fact that certain govern-
ments have brought increasing pressure to bear on the Secretariat
is a proof of the growing political importance they attach to the
League. In so far, it is the symptom, however unwelcome in
itself, of a very welcome development. Furthermore it is ob-
viously conducive to prompt and easy international cooperation
if the governments called upon to cooperate are represented in
Geneva by officials who enjoy their full confidence. This con-
fidence they are, of course, the more likely to enjoy if appointed
on their express recommendation. In a certain respect, the change
which has come about in the relative importance of the national
and international functions of the Secretariat is a tribute paid
to what I have called elsewhere the League to promote inter-
national cooperation by what I have termed the League to pre-
vent war.
In the field of contentious political debate, the absolute inter-
national independence and impartiality of members of the Secre-
tariat is clearly much more important than in that of non-
contentious activities. As the latter field has been tilled by the
League with far greater success than the former, it is not sur-
prising that there has been a trend in favor of another type of
plowman. The sociologically-minded historian will readily detect
here an example of the function influencing the development of
the organ.
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It was originally intended by many that the main duty of the
League should be to prevent war by settling political conflicts
on the basis of justice. If and when the League shall, with con-
fidence and energy, again give this item the first place on its
program of action, the demand for a Secretariat exclusively com-
posed of officials as unbiased and as purely international in their
loyalty as human nature will permit will doubtless again arise.
Meanwhile it should be noted that in at least one of the very rare
cases in which contentious issues vitally involving the political
interests of great powers have come before the League, the Secre-
tariat officials of the interested nationality have remained in the
background. The case to which I refer is the Mosul dispute be-
tween Great Britain and Turkey, in the consideration of which
the place of the British Secretary-General at the Council table was
taken by his French deputy.
It should finally be noted also that, as the League grows more
universal in membership and the Secretariat m ore representative
in its international composition, the disadvantages and dangers
of national bias on the part of the individual officials grow less.
To be sure, justice in international relations is not to be defined
as the mere mathematical resultant of divergent national claims.
There is no doubt, however, that the chances of justice in the
world are greater when all divergent claims are presented with
equal force than when some alone are urged and others ignored
for lack of advocates to press them. After the perhaps impossible
ideal of an international civil service whose members would all
be inspired solely by the pure love of international justice, the
next best thing is therefore a Secretariat in which all national
claims are fairly and freely represented. In this respect, also, the
admission of Germany into the League and of a considerable
number of Germans into the Secretariat should make for greater,
if not necessarily for ideal, justice in the consideration of inter-
national affairs.
THE ADVISORY COMMISSIONS
Besides the Council, the Assembly, and the Secretariat, the
other major organs of the League are the advisory committees,
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EVOLUTION OB" THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 817
the International Labor Organization, and the Permanent Court
of International Justice. Of these I shall say but little, not because
there is little to say, but on the contrary because the detailed
study of their organization and development would take more
time and space than I can spare.
The advisory committees I regard as the most symptomatic
structural product of the League's evolution. As aforesaid, the
Covenant itself provided for only two such organs, the permanent
Military Commission and the permanent Mandates Commission.
The pressure of circumstances, however, has led the Council to
surround itself with a whole army of international experts divided
and subdivided into a large number of divisions, brigades, regi-
ments, and battalions. Almost half of the recently issued "Report
to the eighth ordinary session of the Assembly of the League
on the work of the Council, on the work of the Secretariat, and
on the measures taken to execute the decisions of the Assembly"
is devoted to the activities of these advisory bodies.
In the spring of this year an investigation was made in the
Secretariat as to the number and average duration of meetings
held under the auspices of the League during the years 1920 to
1926. Although these figures include the sessions of the Council
and of the Assembly, they of course relate mainly to meetings of
the various advisory bodies, and they may therefore not ir-
relevantly be quoted in this connection. They are as follows:
Statistics Regarding the Number of Meetings Held Under
the Auspices of the League During the Years 1920-1926
Year
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
Number of meetings
held
23
37
47
67
86
94
105
Average number of days the
meetings were in session
10.00
8.43
5.74
6.82
7.00
5.77
5.54
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What do these facts and figures point to? They have but one
significance. The League of Nations, created essentially as a
political institution to prevent wars between nations, has in fact
become the great administrative agency for the promotion of
voluntary international cooperation between them in time of
peace. The technical advisory committees, which multiply in
number and specialize in function from year to year, are the
structural expression of a world need.
Divided into separate units for purposes of political self-
expression, humanity is, economically and socially, one great
organism. As its component parts become more conscious of
their interdependence, this organism tends to express its unity
by means of other than political institutions. In the present state
of civilization, there is in this respect a fundamental contradiction.
Politically, nations seem to be striving apart, and never have they
been more insistent on their sovereign rights as independent
entities. Economically and socially, however, they are being
drawn closer and closer together by forces which are ever growing
more irresistible and of which they are growing ever more con-
scious. Through its technical organisations and activities, the
League is seeking to reconcile these otherwise incompatible
tendencies. It is striving to overcome the obstacles which the
dogma of national sovereignty has placed along the road of human
evolution. It is thus promoting voluntary cooperation between
those whom frontiers divide, but whom common aims and needs
unite.
The higher the. political barriers, the more imperious the ne-
cessity of international cooperation. But the closer and more con-
tinuous international cooperation becomes, the more irksome and
the less indispensable the high political barriers will doubtless
in time become. Thus, checked in its frontal attack on the citadel
of war by the as yet invincible forces of national sovereignty, the
League is by means of its technical bodies executing a vast flank-
ing movement around and against it. This movement is slow and
its achievement undramatic, but its eventual success seems
assured, unless mankind would deliberately prefer poverty and
stagnation in a state of potential war to well-being, fraternity,
and progress in international security.
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THE INTERNATIONAL LABOK ORGANIZATION
Of all the numerous technical institutions of the League, the
International Labor Organization is the most important, as it is
by far the largest. In fact, under the inspiring leadership of the
fiery director of the International Labor Office, its independence
and its size have become such that it cannot properly be dealt
with as a mere part of the League structure, but calls for special
study. I would here note only that, in its evolution, it has met
with the same difficulties as the rest of the League and that it is
struggling to overcome them by resorting to similar methods.
It was intended primarily to improve social conditions the
world over by gradually levelling them up to the standards of
the most advanced nations. In the drafting, the signing, the
ratification, and, above all, in the effective application, of its
labor conventions, it has constantly been battling against the
forces of national egotism. Without, of course, abandoning this,
its main task, it has tended more and more to enlarge the field
of its cooperative and non-contentious activities. It has thus
become a great international research institution. By ascertaining
the facts of industrial life and progress the world over, and by
disseminating their knowledge by means of its countless publica-
tions, it is attempting to build up a more enlightened public
opinion. Thus it hopes that the obstacles which stand in the way
of the achievement of its main purpose of international legislation
may little by little be overcome.
THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
The Permanent Court of International Justice is the last of
the organs of the League to be considered here. It is, in my opinion,
in many respects the greatest, and would, of course, also de-
mand an independent study. I can but briefly outline its
history and nots the evolution in its functions which, perhaps
partly unforeseen at the time of the drafting of the Covenant, is
doubtless due to the same general causes which have so strongly
influenced the development of the other organs of the League.
Article 14 of the Covenant, which called for the creation of
the Permanent Court of International Justice, reads as follows:
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"The Council shall formulate and submit to the members of the
League for adoption plans for the establishment of a permanent
court of international justice. The court shall be competent to
hear and determine any dispute of an international character
which the parties thereto submit to it. The court may also give
an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it
by the Council or by the Assembly."
The Council, at its second meeting, in February, 1920, decided
to appoint a committee of ten jurists for the purpose of preparing
the plans mentioned in the first sentence of this article. These
jurists met at the Hague in June and July, 1920, and agreed on a
draft statute which, amended by the Council in October, 1920,
and by the first Assembly, was unanimously approved by the
latter body on December 13, 1920. This statute having come
into force before the second Assembly, the Court was elected on
September 14 and 16, 1921, and on January 30, 1922, it met for
its first session.
The most important change proposed by the Council and re-
luctantly accepted by the Assembly was the suppression of the
compulsory jurisdiction with which the jurists had wished to
endow the Court. Although the principle of compulsory juris-
diction seemed to meet with the approval of the majority of the
delegates of the Assembly, it was opposed notably by the repre-
sentatives of France and Great Britain as contrary to the Cove-
nant. It was accordingly sacrificed on the altar of unanimity.
As a concession to the partisans of the extension of the Court's
powers, its jurisdiction was rendered optionally compulsory, i.e.,
compulsory in juridical matters as between those states which
once for all accepted it as such. Of this possibility sixteen states
have availed themselves up to date: nine11 in 1921, four12 in
1922, one13 in 1923, and two14 in 1926.
Accordingly, it would seem, first, that the principle of com-
pulsory jurisdiction is more popular among the minor states than
11
 Bulgaria, Denmark, Haiti, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Uruguay.
ls
 Austria, China, Finland, Lithuania.
18
 Esthonia.
14
 Abyssinia, Belgium.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e.
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f B
as
el
 L
ib
ra
ry
, o
n 
10
 Ju
l 2
01
7 
at
 1
4:
58
:4
3,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
C
am
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s.
 h
tt
ps
:/
/d
oi
.o
rg
/1
0.
23
07
/1
94
75
94
EVOLUTION OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 8 2 1
among the great powers, and, secondly, that it is not gaining
ground very rapidly. It should be noted, however, that its
progress cannot be fairly measured by this standard alone, as
it may be, and has been, promoted also by other means. Thus
every recent year has witnessed an increase in the number of
bilateral and multilateral conventions providing for compulsory
recourse to the Court. As a result, a large section in the field of
international relations is today already placed under its legal
guardianship. If we consider the scores of international agree-
ments which provide in the last resort for the compulsory juris-
diction of the Court—the mandates, minority, Locarno, arbi-
tration treaties, and the host of technical conventions—if we
consider the thousands of possible disputes which may arise over
their interpretation and application, we will note with some
surprise that the Court has been called upon to decide only nine
cases in the course of the last five years. For this apparent
anomaly, there are at least two excellent reasons.
In the first place, resort to the Court, the ultima ratio in peaceful
international relations, is provided for only if negotiations and
attempts at conciliation have failed. Now in spite of certain
glaring failures, one should never overlook the fact that diplomacy
almost invariably succeeds in dealing with current international
affairs. Secondly, almost any negotiated, and therefore willingly
or reluctantly but always freely accepted, solution is preferable
to the costly and uncertain decision of a court. This is true in
international relations still more than in private business. Judicial
decisions are, or at least should be, imperative. If they seldom
give complete satisfaction to the victors, they rarely fail to
produce resentment in the vanquished. The Permanent Court of
International Justice may therefore very well have assured the
negotiated settlement of several disputes by the mere fact of its
existence and the consequent threat of its possible intervention.
For both these reasons, friends of peace should not deplore its
relative inactivity.
Moreover, this inactivity has not been as marked as it would
appear if the rendering of judicial decisions were alone considered.
The Court, as is well known, may also be called upon by the
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Council and the Assembly to give legal advice. As a matter of
fact, this consultative function has been more freely exercised
than the other. Up to date, the Court has delivered advisory
opinions in thirteen different cases. This predominance of the
consultative over the purely judicial functions of the Court is
extremely significant. It is still another symptom of what is, in
my view, the main characteristic of the League's evolution since
its birth. Here, as on every other point on which we have touched
in this study, we see the League developing its voluntary and
cooperative activities at the expense of its coercive functions.
In the present stage of international relations the League may
successfully influence the policy of its member states by advice,
persuasion, and emulation. It apparently cannot yet impose, and
certainly has not yet imposed, its collective will on any re-
calcitrant member. The balance between international solidarity
and national sovereignty is still too heavily weighted in favor
of the latter. In other words, we are still in the first stage of the
transitional period of world history, of which the creation of the
League may be said to have marked the beginning. The center
of gravity of political power is still almost completely in the
capitals of the individual states members of the League, and
not in Geneva.
If humanity is to be spared a relapse into the dark ages of
national extermination through international strife, the present
and future centuries must witness the gradual shifting of this
center of gravity. As in the past the establishment of national
sovereign states alone put an end to armed conflicts between
rival clans, cities, and provinces, so in the future are permanent
international peace and real security difficult to conceive unless
the collective will of mankind be endowed with the power of
overriding that of its constituent national groups. This ultimate
goal is indeed still very far distant. The foundation of the League
of Nations, however, is nothing if not a first momentous step in
that direction.
CONCLUSION: THE FUNCTIONS OP THE LEAGUE
So much for the evolution of the League, that is, of its structure,
its anatomy. To consider with equal detail the development of
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EVOLUTION OF TEE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 823
its activities, its physiology, would require more time and space
than we can here devote to the subject. We can the more readily
dispense with this discussion since what we have noted with
respect to the changes undergone by the organs of the League has
already indicated the general trend of the evolution of its func-
tions. A few general remarks may therefore suffice in conclusion.
In various publications I have examined the functions of the
League under the three headings of the execution of the peace
treaties, the promotion of international cooperation, and the
prevention of war. The comments which this system of classifica-
tion has aroused in various scientific journals confirms my belief
that it is not only convenient but on the whole also sound. I shall
therefore adhere to it here.16
It is in the execution of the peace treaties that the enlargement
of the League's membership has had its most decisive effects.
When the League was born, at the beginning of 1920, its Council
found itself entrusted with the execution of several very important
measures relating notably to minorities, mandates, the Saar basin,
and the free city of Dantzig. The Council, at that time, was,
with the sole exception of the Spanish ambassador in Paris,
entirely made up of representatives of the victorious powers.
These powers had imposed the treaties of peace on the van-
quished and had, at the same time, excluded them from the
League. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that the
spirit in which the Council went about this, its first important
business, was hardly that of a disinterested and impartial magis-
trate.
As one after another of the vanquished joined the League, as
Sweden, in 1922, was elected to the Council, and as finally
Germany, in 1926, was admitted both to the League and to the
Council, a gradual change for the better took place in this respect.
Although that evolution has not yet reached its natural con-
clusion, it is certain that, to mention only two examples, the
administration of the Saar and the protection of minorities are
16
 See La Politique de la Suisse dans la Sociiti des Nations, translated into German
as Die Politik der Schweiz im Volkerbund (Coire and Leipzig, 1925), and International
Relations as Viewed from Geneva (New Haven and Oxford, 1925).
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today being carried on in a more equitable and less vindictive
spirit than was the case in 1920. As was to be expected, it is in
this field that the influence of Germany in the League has been
most noticeable and the intervention of her representatives at
the Council table most active and most effective.
If permanent peace can only be based on justice and if justice
in international relations, as elsewhere, demands that fair and
impartial treatment be measured out to all concerned, then the
recent evolution of the League of Nations in the execution of the
treaties is tending in the direction of permanent peace. The goal,
although not yet attained, is now in sight. The sooner it is reached
the better, not only for those at whose expense the treaties were
drawn up and for their authors, but especially also for the League
itself, to whom the war bequeathed, as a most unwelcome and
onerous legacy, the duty of settling its estate.
In the field of international cooperation, as we have already
seen, the League is performing a very useful, a very varied, and
an ever increasing task. Its main achievements here would seem
to lie in the economic sphere. In this sphere the list of the services
it has rendered to humanity is already very long and very honor-
able. May it suffice to recall the reconstruction of Austria and of
Hungary, as well as the more recent feats in Greece and in Bul-
garia. The list has recently been lengthened by the addition of
the successful Economic Conference in May, 1927.
Economic progress in international affairs can be promoted
only through the combined efforts of individual enterprise, state
action, and League coordination. Of the three members of this
team, no one will dispute that the League has, since its existence,
pulled at least its full share of the load. If all states were wise and
courageous enough to follow the advice they have received from
the League, especially in Brussels in 1920 and in Geneva in 1927,
the world in general and Europe in particular would soon be out
of the thorny economic jungle in which they have been plunged
as a result of the war.
The record of the League in its efforts to prevent war, its third
and most important task, is, alas, not so brilliant. Doubtless it
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has indirectly done much to promote peace by more fairly exe-
cuting the peace treaties and by promoting international co-
operation. Doubtless, also, it has directly done no less to promote
peace by promoting publicity and arbitration in international
relations. But it would be a bold, a very superficial, or a very
dubious friend of the League who would pretend that in the
matter of the pacific revision of obsolete treaties and in the field
of security and disarmament, Geneva has not grievously dis-
appointed the world.
Article 8 of the Covenant, adopted in 1919, provides that "the
members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace
requires the reduction of national armaments." When we realize
that today, after nearly eight years of investigation, study, and
debate by the Council, the Assembly, the Permanent Military
Commission, the Temporary Mixed Commission, countless special
committees, sub-committees, and conferences, the powers have
failed to bind themselves to carry out this pledge, or even to agree
on a plan of reduction of armaments, and when they still show
the greatest reluctance to arrive at a conclusion on a plan which
would aim merely to limit their armaments, that is, to maintain
them at the present level, it requires more official optimism than
I can muster to declare complacently that reasonable progress
has been made toward the solution of a very difficult problem.
It must be frankly admitted that here we are faced with a real
failure—a failure more disquieting, as I see it, in its causes than
in its immediate consequences.
The main results of this failure are a continued burden of
taxation for all concerned and a continued, and perhaps increasing,
state of international suspicion. But unfortunate and dangerous
as these are, the lack of security which explains, if it does not
completely justify, the ineffectiveness of all previous efforts
toward disarmament would seem more unfortunate and more
dangerous still. Nations may refrain from disarmament for any
one of three reasons: the desire to maintain their authority over
discontented subjects of the state at home or abroad, the will to
extend it at the expense of their neighbors, or finally the fear of
encroachment and aggression from without. Of these three
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factors, which doubtless all play some part in preventing dis-
armament today, the last is certainly the most important.
The main justification of national armaments is, therefore, the
feeling of national insecurity. Nations feel insecure because they
do not trust their neighbors and because, distrusting them, they
do not and cannot as yet rely on the League as an institution able
and willing to protect them in case of need. Dispel this inter-
national suspicion, and the protection of the League becomes
both easy and unnecessary. Create confidence in the protection
of the League, and international suspicion becomes both less
real and less dangerous.
To dispel international suspicion and to create confidence in the
protection of the League are consequently the two fundamental
methods of promoting disarmament. Both have been and are
being applied, but neither as yet with very great success. As long
as the nations, insisting on their ultimate right to be a law unto
themselves, refuse to accept unconditionally the supreme au-
thority of a world commonwealth, they will remain a threat one
to another and therefore a danger to themselves.
The League of Nations is a timid and still only half-conscious
effort to establish this supreme authority. If we were to base our
present attitude and our forecasts on a comparison between the
League as it is today and as it would be if its authority were un-
questioned and universal, we might well lose hope. But if, more
wisely, we compare the world today with the League such as it is
and as it is growing daily, with the world as it would be without
the League—as it was without the League ten years ago—then
our generation should be filled with gratitude for the past and
with confidence, courage, and determination for the future.
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